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The main and novel idea in The Varieties of Self-Knowledge is that self-knowledge—
that is, our knowledge of our own mental states—comes in many ways. We have first-
personal knowledge of our own mental states when, for instance, we are immediately
aware of our occurrent sensations. By contrast, we have third-personal knowledge when,
for example, we realize that we enjoy a given mental state by reflecting on our behavior
and by inferring to its likely cause. Even when distinctively first-personal knowledge is
at stake, it must be kept in mind that we have a variety of mental states. For instance, we
enjoy sensations, such as pains and tickles, which have a characteristic phenomenology,
but also perceptions that have both a phenomenal and a representational content; we
have propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires and intentions and these come in
various fashions—as dispositions and as commitments—that is, as the result of one’s
own deliberations based on considering evidence for or against a given proposition or
course of action. Finally, we enjoy emotions, whose nature still escapes philosophical
consensus. Such a variety of mental states invites caution in propounding single, all-
encompassing accounts of how we may know each of these types of mental state. In
particular, while it is clear that sensations and at least some emotions have a distinctive
phenomenology and can be had also by creatures who cannot self-ascribe them, it is
more difficult to maintain that propositional attitudes have an intrinsic phenomenology
which can distinguish wishes from hopes, say, or beliefs from acceptances, etc. Percep-
tions too have their typical phenomenology, but they also provide a representation of the
environment around the perceiver, or of her body, which is independent of the exercise
of concepts, at least when Bbasic^ perceptions are at stake. Hence they can be enjoyed by
creatures who are incapable of self-ascribing them. By contrast, for propositional
attitudes as commitments it makes sense to hold that they can at least in part be
constituted by their very self-ascription, like when one deliberates by judging BI intend
to do such and so^ and there does not seem to be any room for the suggestion that one
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It is fair to say that, despite the fact that by now a lot of philosophers working on
self-knowledge—particularly on first-personal self-knowledge—are aware of the lim-
itations in scope of their preferred accounts, and are therefore at least implicitly
committed to pluralism about self-knowledge (particularly of methods, but perhaps,
in some cases of both methods and states), they have been reluctant to embrace it
explicitly.1 For some reason, which seems mostly to reveal a monistic prejudice, they
seem to think that if their preferred theory has only limited application, it is not
interesting (or not interesting enough). Subject to a craving for generality, which, as
said, is likely due to a deep-seated monistic prejudice, they often attempt to extend their
preferred theory of self-knowledge to mental states that are after all resilient to the
treatment, thus ending up weakening their own accounts. Sometimes, in this vein, they
realize that the attempt to generalise their preferred accounts stumbles, in particular,
against the asymmetry between first- and third-personal self-knowledge; and, as a
consequence, they are led to denying it, or to making it a difference in degree rather
than in kind.2 Or else, they tend to consider of limited philosophical interest and
significance the kinds of self-knowledge they knowledgeably do not account for. Thus,
you find theorists mostly interested in first-personal self-knowledge who downplay the
importance of an inquiry into third-personal self-knowledge, typically on the grounds
that it would not be especially interesting from an epistemological point of view.3
Conversely, those who offer an account that works mostly for third-personal self-
knowledge, and who realize that they cannot fully account for first-personal self-
knowledge, insist on the irrelevance of the latter particularly to personal development
vis-à-vis the importance of the former.4 Hence, the bias towards monism can have
various effects; going from leading one to the pursuit of generality at the expense of
credibility, to the denial of structural differences between first- and third-personal self-
knowledge, or, finally, to being chauvinist with respect to those forms of self-
knowledge one admittedly cannot account for.
The Varieties of Self-Knowledge unashamedly buys into pluralism about self-
knowledge. It does so by first presenting in some detail the plurality of mental states
we enjoy and their intrinsic differences. It then defends the existence of a deep
asymmetry—that is, an asymmetry in kind and not merely in degree—between first-
and third-personal forms of self-knowledge. It then reviews several theories of first-
personal self-knowledge, discussing their various pitfalls, but also accepting their
kernels of truth, which are put at the service of a pluralistic account of self-
knowledge. The latter consists in a plurality of methods, in particular when third-
personal self-knowledge is at stake, and of states, since, while in third-personal self-
knowledge subjects stand in a genuinely epistemic relation to their own mental
states, in cases of first-personal self-knowledge they don’t.
1 A notable exception is Boyle (2009, 2011). His kind of pluralism, however, is more limited than the one
defended in The Varieties of Self-Knowledge, for he mainly stresses the difference between first-personal self-
knowledge of propositional attitudes as commitments and of one’s passive mental states, such as sensations
and perceptions. Furthermore, he thinks that knowledge of our own beliefs is more fundamental than any other
kind of first-personal self-knowledge. The latter is not a claim I endorse.
2 Gopnik (1983) and Cassam (2014) are a case in point.
3 Moran (2001) is a clear case in point, but most theorists working on self-knowledge tend to implicitly
endorse the same attitude as Moran’s.
4 Cassam (2014), who defends inferentialism, is a case in point. For a critical assessment, see Coliva (2016).
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In more detail, the chapter titled BVarieties of mental states^ introduces the variety of
mental states we enjoy, and proposes a systematization of the complex geography of the
mental. It first distinguishes between sensations and perceptions, by reference to the fact
that only the latter have correctness conditions, while allowing that their contents, at
least in the case of Bbasic^ perceptions, may be entertained also by creatures who do not
possess the concepts necessary to their canonical specification. Then propositional
attitudes such as beliefs, desires and intentions are distinguished between two kinds—
that is, those as dispositions and as commitments. While the former may be independent
of judgment and may well be unconscious, the latter depend on judging either that P is
the case, or that P would be good to have or do (in light of one’s further goals). For such a
reason, these mental states may also be called Bjudgment-dependent^ propositional
attitudes. Moreover, they constitutively involve the ability to accept criticism or of being
self-critical if one does not live up to them. Afterwards, the complex case of emotions is
considered. The view of emotions as sui generis mental states, not reducible to either
sensations or judgements (or to an amalgam of the two), is put forward.
The subsequent chapter, titled BVarieties of self-knowledge^, presents and discusses
the characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge—namely, so-called
Btransparency ,^ Bauthority^ and Bgroundlessness^. At first approximation, transparen-
cy amounts to the idea that subjects who possess the relevant concepts, as well as
rational and possessed of normal intelligence, are such that when they enjoy a given
mental state they are immediately in a position to self-ascribe it. Authority, in contrast,
has that subjects’ psychological self-ascriptions are correct, at least in the normal run of
cases. Finally, according to Bgroundlessness^, subjects’ psychological self-ascriptions
are not based on the observation of their own mental states or on inference starting from
their own observed behaviour and possibly further aspects of one’s own psychology. In
fact, each element in this triad admits of different readings and the chapter discusses
them in depth and defines their proper domain of application. The key idea defended in
this chapter is that transparency, authority and groundlessness are not contingent but
necessary and a priori aspects of what goes by the name of first-personal self-knowl-
edge. For massive failures at this kind of self-knowledge would either display the lack
of the relevant psychological concepts or failures at rationality. Rationality, in this
connection, has to be understood in a Bthick^, rather than in a Bthin^ sense. The latter
amounts to the idea that we are critical reasoners insofar as we revise our propositional
attitudes and goals on the basis of countervailing reasons. However, I agree with
several philosophers (Peacocke (1999), Bar-On (2004) and Cassam (2014), just to
mention a few) who, contra Sydney Shoemaker (1996) and Tyler Burge (1996), do not
think that self-knowledge is necessary for being critical reasoners. If that is the notion
of rationality one has in mind, then lack of self-knowledge will not make one
necessarily irrational. Yet, we also have a thick notion of rationality, according to
which making certain psychological self-ascriptions and behaving in ways which run
systematically against them would impugn the idea that we are confronted with a
normal subject, up to the point of rendering her pronouncements onto herself irrelevant,
a mere flatus vocis devoid of any significance, if not of meaning altogether. These
characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge are then defended against possible
objections stemming from recent findings in cognitive sciences. For instance, several
studies in cognitive science tend to show that we do not have knowledge of our own
character traits, that we are bad at affective forecasting—that is, at figuring out how we
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would actually feel if some relevant change happened to our lives—and, finally, that we
are really poor at identifying the causes of our decisions and further behavior. None of
this, however, shows that we never have essentially first-personal self-knowledge.
Rather, it shows that its scope is limited and does not extend to our deep seated and
future dispositions, or to the causal relations among our various mental states, which
are known in a third-personal way. Yet, all this is compatible with the fact that we have
essentially first-personal knowledge of a wide range of mental states, such as our
sensations, perceptions, basic emotions and propositional attitudes as commitments.
The volume then presents and critically discusses various accounts of first-personal
self-knowledge that have been proposed, with special emphasis on contemporary
versions of each of these theories. Hence, in the chapter titled BEpistemically robust
accounts^ examines inner-sense and inferentialist accounts of self-knowledge. The
former model tends to equate self-knowledge to forms of knowledge based on outer
observation, though granting a subject’s privileged access to her own mental states. In
particular, its contemporary versions, due mostly to David Armstrong (1968) and
William Lycan (1996), claim that we have a reliable inner mechanism that Bscans^
our first-order mental states and produces the corresponding second-order ones. The
chief objection against that view is that the model presupposes a crude form of
reliabilism that severs the constitutive connection between self-knowledge, rationality
and concepts’ possession.
The inferentialist model, in contrast, tends to assimilate self-knowledge to knowl-
edge of other people’s mental states. Recently, it has been taken up and partially re-
fashioned by Alison Gopnik (1983), who has developed a Btheory-theory^ account.
Within the first 3–4 years of life, children acquire and develop a little theory of the
mind, that they apply both to themselves and others, in order to (self-)ascribe mental
states starting from the observation of overt behavior (or other Binner promptings^).
Her views have given rise to a heated debate, at the interface of philosophy of mind,
psychology and neuroscience, between supporters of the theory-theory approach and
partisans of so-called Bsimulation^ theories, such as Alvin Goldman (1993) and
Robert Gordon (1995, 2007). According to simulation theorists, who are otherwise
divided on many issues, knowledge of other people’s mental states is not based on the
application of a theory, but on the simulation of the other person’s point of view,
which gives rise to a psychological ascription based on what one oneself would feel
and think if one were in the other person’s shoes. These views are exposed and
critically examined. The main objection against the inferentialist account is that it
implausibly assimilates first-personal self-knowledge to knowledge of other people’s
mental states. Furthermore, it runs the risk of providing a circular account of self-
knowledge and it succumbs as soon as one tries, like in Quassim Cassam’s (2014)
recent version of it, to make it transcend its proper domain of application. The main
criticism against simulation theories, in contrast, is that they are in fact unclear about
how we would get knowledge of our own minds, on the basis of which we should
then gain knowledge of other people’s mental states, and risk falling back onto other,
problematical models of self-knowledge (such as the inner sense model). Simulation
theorists, in particular Gordon, also have interesting but underdeveloped views about
the nature and acquisition of psychological concepts, such as the concept of belief and
of other propositional attitudes. Still, both inferentialism and simulative accounts have
important things to say about some instances of third-personal self-knowledge, such
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as knowledge of our deep-seated dispositions and the kind of self-knowledge we can
gain through affective forecasting.
In the chapter called BEpistemically weak accounts^ various models, which are
united in claiming that self-knowledge is indeed a kind of modest, yet genuinely
cognitive achievement, are discussed. Some of them can be traced back to some
remarks by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of Reference. According to Evans (1982),
in order to know our own beliefs, we only need to look outward, see if we can answer
Byes^ to the question as to whether P is the case, and then preface P with BI believe^.
Lately, Evans’ insights have been developed especially by Richard Moran (2001) and
Jordi Fernández (2013). The latter is criticized for implausibly claiming that the
evidence which justifies one’s belief in P is also the one that justifies one’s self-
ascription of that belief. The former, in contrast, is criticised for not offering any
suitable explanation of why self-knowledge of our propositional attitudes should, after
all, count as an epistemic achievement and for tending to equate first-personal self-
knowledge with making up one’s mind. Intuitively, however, we also have first-
personal self-knowledge of several mental states, which are not the result of any
deliberation on our part, such as sensations, perceptions and (at least basic) emotions.
Significantly different, yet still epistemic accounts have been proposed by Christo-
pher Peacocke (1999, 2003) and Tyler Burge (1996, 2011). Peacocke, in particular,
places crucial emphasis on the fact that first-order propositional attitudes have a
characteristic phenomenology. Accordingly there is something that it is like to judge
that P, for instance. We are therefore aware of our judgment that P, qua such a judgment
and, by tacitly applying the rule that if one judges that P, one believes it, we correctly
self-ascribe the corresponding belief. Burge’s account, finally, takes self-knowledge to
be a requirement of rationality (in a Bthin^ sense): in order to be rational thinkers we
must be prepared to revise our beliefs on the basis of countervailing evidence. Hence,
we are entitled—that is, non-discursively justified—to self-ascribe them. Such a
second-order belief, in its turn, amounts to knowledge since it is true and justified
(albeit non-discursively).
The main objection against those epistemic accounts that devote special attention to
inner phenomenology is that such a distinctive phenomenology does not really differ-
entiate between various kinds of propositional attitudes. For instance, it is difficult to
say what distinguishes hopes from wishes at the phenomenological level. This will
have a direct bearing on Peacocke’s position. For, if the phenomenology is not
sufficiently fine-grained to license a specific psychological attribution, it cannot be
appealed to in order to explain self-knowledge. Furthermore, it is claimed, against
Peacocke’s position, that it runs the risk of providing a circular account of our
knowledge of our propositional attitudes. For, if, in order to avoid the previous
problem, it posits a subject’s antecedent knowledge of her own beliefs (or of other
related propositional attitudes such as judgments vis-à-vis beliefs), it would actually
presuppose self-knowledge rather than explain it.
In contrast, Burge’s account is criticized mainly for either implausibly claiming that
Bthin^ rationality requires knowledge of what kinds of attitude one is enjoying, or else,
for resting on an ad hoc notion of rationality, which compromises the interest of his
theory. Moreover, claiming that self-knowledge is constitutive of being a reasoner does
not provide an epistemic account of it. It merely points out an a priori connection.
Indeed, if Burge were to supplement his account by saying that one gets to know one’s
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attitudes through the operation of some reliable cognitive mechanism, the epistemic
aspects of his account of self-knowledge would be dangerously close to crude reliabilist
theories of self-knowledge, already presented and criticized in the previous chapter.
The following chapter, titled BExpressivism about self-knowledge^, considers
expressivist accounts of our knowledge of our own mental states. The basic, under-
lying idea is that self-ascriptions of mental properties are ways of expressing our own
minds other than in natural and instinctive ways, such as, for instance, by means of
cries and laughter. After presenting and critically examining Wittgenstein’s (1953)
approach, which is at the origins of expressivist positions, as well as of some aspects
of constitutive ones, I dwell on Dorit Bar-On’s (2004) recent and powerful defence of
that model. While generally sympathetic to that approach, I claim that it is much
better suited to account for our knowledge of sensations, rather than of propositional
attitudes and certainly it cannot be generalized across the board to provide an all-
encompassing account of our knowledge of our minds. In particular, it does not
explain those cases in which our first-order mental states originate in our self-
ascriptions, like when, for instance, we deliberate BI intend to φ^ or judge BI
judge/opine/wish… that P^ and there does not seem to be room for the idea that
we would thereby be expressing a pre-existing mental state. Nor does it explain how
we can actually have knowledge, obtained through a cognitive achievement, of many
dispositional mental states we enjoy. Furthermore, difficulties emerge as soon as one
tries to combine expressivism with the view that self-knowledge is, after all, the result
of some sort of cognitive achievement, like in Bar-On’s account. For if the model
presupposes the existence of an inner scanning mechanism, it falls prey to the
objections raised against inner-sense theories. If, in contrast, it presupposes some
other kind of epistemic access to one’s own first-order mental states, it succumbs to
the difficulties presented against Burge’s idea that we are entitled to our psychological
self-ascriptions. Bar-On’s new Bexpressive entitlements^, moreover, are reviewed and
found wanting. Hence, the supposed advantage of expressivism over its rivals, which
should allegedly consist in avoiding observationalism, inferentialism and other unpal-
atable accounts of the epistemology of first-personal self-knowledge, is spoiled. Still,
expressivism has something important to say about our Bknowledge^ of our own
sensations; moreover, it can be extended also to our Bknowledge^ of our own
perceptions and can offer interesting insights about the nature and the acquisition of
several psychological concepts. These insights are built upon in the final chapter of
the volume.
In the following chapter, so-called Bconstitutive^ accounts of self-knowledge are
dealt with. At the heart of this kind of approach lie two main ideas. First, that first-
personal self-knowledge is not the result of any cognitive achievement, but rather
consists in some conceptual truths, corresponding to transparency, authority and
groundlessness, which can be variously redeemed. Hence, properly speaking, self-
knowledge is not really a form of knowledge. This result is indirectly supported by
the failure of the various attempts to account for first-personal self-knowledge as a real
cognitive accomplishment examined in previous chapters. Second, proper constitutive
positions are characterized by two metaphysical claims. The first one is that, under
specifiable conditions, first- and second-order mental states do not have separate
existence. The second is that, at least in part and under specifiable conditions, our
first-order mental states are constituted by their very self-ascription.
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The model has been defended in various ways starting with Sydney Shoemaker’s
(1996) pioneering work, through Crispin Wright’s (2001) and Jane Heal’s (2002)
linguistic version of constitutivism, up to Akeel Bilgrami’s (2006) agential version of
constitutivism. A profitable way of presenting their debate is to see them as according
different priorities to either side of the following biconditional, known as the Consti-
tutive thesis, and as providing different characterizations of its C-conditions:
Given C, one believes/desires/intends that P/to φ iff one believes (or judges) that
one believes/desires/intends that P/to φ
According to Shoemaker, priority must be given to its left-to-right side and the C-
conditions must be characterized by reference to subjects who possess normal intelli-
gence, rationality and are endowed with the relevant psychological concepts. According
to Wright, in contrast, the right-to-left side is the fundamental one and the C-conditions
must refer to the communal linguistic practice of making psychological avowals, which
are usually taken as authoritative. Finally, according to Bilgrami, the two sides of the bi-
conditional are on a par and the C-conditions must make reference to the fact that the
mental states at issue are such that it makes sense to regard the subject as responsible for
them—that is, to be either blame- or praise-worthy for them. Each of these positions is
presented and found wanting for either resting on dubious a priori claims regarding, for
instance, the necessity of self-knowledge for being a reasoner, or for failing to vindicate
the central metaphysical contentions of constitutivism.
I then introduce a metaphysically robust brand of constitutivism, which is claimed to
hold only for a very limited class of mental states. Namely, for those propositional
attitudes as commitments we undertake by deliberating what to believe, desire, intend
to do, etc., on the basis of evaluating (or at least of being able to evaluate) evidence in
favor of P/φ-ing, or of its desirability or advisability. When these propositional attitudes
are at stake, and the subject is endowed with the relevant psychological concepts,
which are acquired Bblindly ,^5 both sides of the biconditional hold as a matter of
conceptual necessity and, in particular, the right-to-left side actually makes good the
second metaphysical commitment characteristic of constitutive accounts. Thus, adult
human beings actually have two ways of forming commitments, either by judging their
contents, or else by directly self-ascribing them. In the latter case, then, authority is
secured in a much stronger way, since the psychological self-ascription is actually self-
verifying. Furthermore, the account is supplemented by an explanation of how we
acquire and canonically deploy the relevant psychological concepts, which does away
with the idea that psychological concepts are either tags for mental states one should
already have in view, or a priori rules one should self-consciously apply, often by
having in view either other mental states or even the very mental states one would
thereby categorize. This account, in its turn, helps to make good the first metaphysical
claim at the heart of constitutive positions. Namely, that, when subjects are rational,
intelligent and conceptually endowed, first-order mental states and their self-ascriptions
do not have separate existence. For the latter are seen as replacements of instinctive and
direct forms of expression of one’s on-going first-order mental states, which are integral
5 That is to say, by being drilled to substitute their immediate avowal, BP ,^ BPwould be good to have^, BI willφ^,
with the corresponding psychological one—that is, BI believe that P ,^ BI want/desire that P ,^ BI intend to φ^.
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to those very first-order mental states, rather than judgements about already singled out
first-order mental states.
Such a position is then defended against the objection that we may be self-
deceived and thus ascribe to ourselves a mental state—particularly a propositional
attitude—we in fact lack. The key move consists in denying—following Bilgrami’s
lead—that self-deception is a case in which one goes wrong about one’s first-order
mental states. Rather, it consists in having two mutually inconsistent propositional
attitudes—one as a commitment and one as a disposition—which give rise to a
subject’s somewhat irrational behavior. Yet one’s self-ascription of the commitment
is actually correct, even if one happens to behave in ways that run contrary to it, due
to one’s counter dispositions.
In the last chapter, called BPluralism about self-knowledge^, a pluralist account of
self-knowledge is put forward. As the discussion of the previous chapter makes
apparent, constitutive accounts can hold in their full-blooded version only for our
(so-called) knowledge of our propositional attitudes as commitments. By contrast, it
is argued that knowledge of one’s own propositional attitudes as dispositions is usually
achieved through inference to the best explanation—in the same way in which we can
know of other people’s mental states by inferring to them from their owners’ overt
behavior and by exploiting some general theory of the mind. However, only in one’s
own case can the inference be based on relevant inner promptings, such as sensations,
emotions and further mental states. In some other cases, instead, it can depend on
deploying simulative methods, like when we engage in affective forecasting. Moreover,
it can be obtained by means of the self-conscious deployment of highly dispositional
psychological concepts. In this case, there is inferential reasoning going on, but it is not
a kind of inference to the best explanation. Rather, it consists in subsuming some
aspects of one’s overall behavior and mental states under a concept by self-consciously
exploiting its characteristic notes. Finally, at times, third-personal self-knowledge can
be obtained through testimony.6
Turning to first-personal self-knowledge, it is claimed that strong constitutive
accounts have limited purchase also because, for instance, they do not extend to past
self-ascriptions of propositional attitudes as commitments, which are known, when they
are, based on mnestic evidence. Still, it is true that being able to remember one’s past
mental actions, or indeed other mental states, as well as one’s own past actions, is
constitutive of being a cognitively well-functioning human being. Yet, to stress, that
does not mean that we can account for our knowledge of these past mental states along
constitutivist lines.
Moreover, strong constitutive accounts are not apt to explain self-knowledge of our
sensations and of other mental states that have a distinctive phenomenology and that
are clearly independent of our ability to self-ascribe them, such as bodily sensations,
basic emotions, perceptions and perceptual experiences. Here the most promising
account will have to forsake the second metaphysical claim at the heart of strong
constitutive explanations, according to which psychological self-ascriptions can at least
partially constitute the first-order mental states they ascribe to a subject. What remains
are simply the other characteristic claims of constitutive positions, according to which
conceptually competent creatures are authoritative, at least in the normal run of cases,
6 I have explored this theme further in Coliva 2018.
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with respect to their own mental states and are immediately in a position to self-ascribe
them without either observing their own mental states or their overt behavior. These
first-order mental states, however, can exist independently of their self-ascription.
Hence, the allegedly epistemic problem of self-knowledge becomes the problem of
explaining how the relevant concepts are acquired and canonically applied without
falling back into observational or inferential models. Expressivism becomes crucial in
this connection because it allows one to avoid these pitfalls. In particular, the idea is put
forward that when we deal with self-ascriptions of sensations and occurrent basic
emotions, which have a distinctive (often bodily) phenomenology, possessing the
relevant concepts is the result of having been drilled to substitute their more immediate
expressions with verbal behavior. This conceptual drilling is what gives rise to their
characteristic first-personal Bknowledge^. Yet, the latter is crucially not the result of
any, however modest, cognitive achievement. Hence, the use of term Bknowledge^ in
this connection is more the—Bgrammatical^, as Wittgenstein would have it—signal of
the absence of room for sensible doubt and ignorance (at least in the normal run of
cases), rather than the mark of a genuinely epistemic relationship between a subject and
her own sensations and basic emotions. Furthermore, seeing the avowal as a replace-
ment of more instinctive forms of behaviour helps vindicate the claim that the first-
order mental state and its self-ascription are not separate existences.
Similarly, I propose an expressivist account of our Bknowledge^ of our own
perceptions, which is held to originate in blind drilling. The idea, once more, is that
we first learn to voice their contents and, on that basis, we are drilled to express
ourselves by prefacing such contents with BI see that^ or BI hear that^, etc. Therefore,
our knowledge of our perceptions does not usually require us to attend to our experi-
ences and to identify them as seeings (or hearings, etc.) either directly or through the
application of a little psychological theory.
The case of non-basic emotions is different. For we usually know them by attending
to a complexity of events, such as their characteristic phenomenological aspects (if and
when they have them) as well as our own behavior in contextually salient occasions.
Moreover, we usually infer from these data to their likely causes, such as the love for a
given person or the envy for her success, etc. Indeed, our application of this little theory
may often take place in rapid and almost unnoticeable ways, but only because we are
already proficient in applying it. Indeed, genealogically or in new, unexpected cases it
will require time and effort and possibly help from a third party. For we may well be at
a loss about how to interpret the pool of data about ourselves we may have collected.
That is to say, we may need the intervention of another person to be in a position to
infer that our characteristic feelings and behavior are signs of love or envy. Moreover, a
lot of our third-personal self-knowledge, such as affective forecasting or knowledge of
one’s deep-seated dispositions will depend on simulating relevant aspects of a given
situation to see how we would react to it, thereby acquiring some insight into our own
nature and character. Reading novels and watching movies can achieve similar results
insofar as we may identify with the protagonists or be prompted to simulate salient
aspects of the plot to see how we would react if we found ourselves in those situations.
Finally, it should be stressed that, contrary to the kind of self-verifying self-ascrip-
tions that have commitments as contents, in all cases in which psychological self-
ascriptions substitute more instinctive forms of behavior, there is however limited room
for error. Due to slips of the tongue, or to somewhat impaired cognitive conditions, a
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subject could actually voice sensations, basic emotions or perceptions she is not
actually enjoying. Yet, constitutivism can take care of these possibilities by appropri-
ately specifying the relevant C-conditions. By contrast, when the self-ascription of
dispositions or of non-basic emotions is at stake, there is no default presumption that a
subject should be authoritative with respect to them. For she will be as exposed to error
as she would be if she were applying her psychological theory in order to get
knowledge of another person’s mental states.
At least since Shoemaker’s work, an account of self-knowledge has been taken to
have a bearing on the perplexing yet fundamental phenomenon of Moore’s paradox—
the paradox, that is, consisting in judging BP, but I do not believe it^ or BI believe that
P, but it is not the case that P .^ Accordingly, in the Appendix, the proposed account of
commitments and their distinctively first-personal self-knowledge is brought to bear
on it. In particular, it is claimed that only by countenancing propositional attitudes as
commitments can Moore’s paradox so much as exist. By contrast, if one took its
doxastic conjuncts to express (the lack of) beliefs as dispositions, the paradox would,
surprisingly, disappear. Indeed, the case of a self-deceived subject who discovers her
self-deception can perfectly well illustrate the point. For one may find oneself in a
position in which one would coherently assert BI believe that my husband is unfaithful
to me, but he is not^; where the first conjunct expresses a disposition one has found
out by observing one’s own behavior and by inferring to its likely cause, and the
second conjunct expresses one’s belief as a commitment, given one’s knowledge of
one’s spouse’s loyal behavior. By contrast, it would seem that if, by uttering (or
judging) that very sentence, one where trying, through its first conjunct, to express a
commitment, its second conjunct would actually undo it. This, in fact, would generate
a Moorean paradox. Thus, the interesting an novel result is that the existence of
Moore’s paradox can be secured only by countenancing essentially normative mental
states such as commitments.
Hence, to conclude: what goes by the name of Bself-knowledge^ is a blend of
disparate factors. Sometimes psychological self-ascriptions actually constitute the
corresponding first-order mental states and while one cannot fail to Bknow^ them, it
is not because one entertains a particular epistemic relation to one’s first-order mental
states. Rather, it is because the self-ascription brings them about and is therefore
necessarily authoritative. Some other time, they are alternative ways of giving expres-
sion to mental states, which can exist independently of them, resulting from being
drilled to substitute their immediate expression with the relevant linguistic behavior.
Still, under appropriately specified C-conditions, being in a position immediately to
self-ascribe them and being correct in one’s self-ascription are guaranteed to hold a
priori and as a matter of conceptual necessity. Finally, in many cases, self-knowledge is
actually the result of the application to one’s own case of a little psychological theory or
of simulative strategies, or indeed of an inferential deployment of highly dispositional
psychological concepts, or, lastly, it is obtained through testimony. Only in these latter
cases would self-knowledge be the result of some kind of cognitive achievement and
the term Bknowledge^ would, accordingly, express an epistemic relation between a
subject and her own mental states. In all other cases, by contrast, the term Bknowledge^
would rather signal the fact that there is no room for error, when self-verifying self-
ascriptions are at stake, or at least not in the normal run of cases, when we are dealing
with self-ascriptions of sensations, basic emotions, perceptions and perceptual
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experiences. Either way, self-knowledge is valuable either because of its constitutive
links with (Bthick^) rationality, concepts’ possession, and, at least in some cases,
responsible agency; or else, because it can help us have a better, more integrated and
unitary life. Small surprise, then, that Western philosophy since its inception appropri-
ated the dictum of the oracle of Delphi BKnow thyself^.
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